Introduction
At the heart of defence procurement lies a great paradox. At its simplest, the dilemma is a consequence of the tension between national 'sovereignty': an imperative to secure the supply of defence equipment and through this to realise the national security, economic and political benefits, and integration: the imperative for states to share the enormous costs of defence equipment production and procurement with other partners. The tension between these two imperatives is one of the intractable dilemmas that officials and politicians struggle with, and that academics and theorists scrutinise and explore. It is also one of the core themes that run not only through this volume, but through the wider body of literature examining the political economy of defence. 1 For policymakers, the tensions are manifest in a series of choices and trade-offs that have serious security and economic implications. Sharing the development of a complex weapons system with allies may reduce its costs and increase interoperability, but it also presents challenges to the security of the supply chain (see Chapter 14 for supplementary observations). For academics, the tensions have spawned considerable debate over whether the notion of national security of supply in advanced weapons has become a redundant concept, and normative questions about how states can or should balance sovereignty imperatives against counter-imperatives to offset affordability constraints by meeting their defence procurement needs through forms of international cooperation and government-induced transnational industrial restructuring. 2 These difficult choices and trade-offs harry national governments even at the best of times when budget deficits are low and economies are flourishing. But they become particularly acute when public money is tight, and wider security environments are volatile and shifting. It is in this latter position that the UK government currently finds itself, following the decision on 23 June 2016, by the majority of UK voters to leave the European Union in an 'in-out' referendum. From a defence procurement perspective, the United Kingdom and European Union now both face unresolved questions about the impact of Brexit on Britain and the EU's future defence procurement and defence industries. The United Kingdom has long preferred to emphasise sovereignty over integration in its defence procurement choices, where other EU Member States have historically advocated ever-closer European integration in defence production and supply, particularly supporting supranational initiatives with a view to creating a globally competitive and autonomous European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB). In the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union' (TfEU [alternatively] hereinafter the Treaty), the European Union has ended up with a Treaty that supports both, on the one hand, seeking to preserve national sovereignty considerations while encouraging and driving increasingly integrated defence procurement.
In this chapter, we explore this great paradox through the prism of Brexit. In so doing, we attempt not only to provide a substantive update of our pre-and postreferendum analyses of the possible implications of Brexit for UK and EU defence procurement and industrial policies, 3 but also to draw some of the wider implications of that analysis for (and towards) a political economic theory of defence procurement.
Our analysis here falls into four sections. The first section focuses on the current United Kingdom leaves the Single European Market (SEM) and is forced to operate under WTO rules. In doing so, the section identifies the potential benefits and costs for the United Kingdom and remaining EU Member States under each scenario. In the concluding section, we draw out the wider theoretical implications of the analysis, highlighting the deep, persistent tensions -the great paradox -that underpins defence procurement.
The State of Brexit Negotiations
Some two years on from the June 2016 in-out referendum, the British government and the remaining 27 EU Member States are locked in negotiations on the nature of their post-Brexit trading relationship. 4 The British government -with relative consistencysays that the United Kingdom will leave the EU SEM and Customs Union, and that it will negotiate a bespoke free trade agreement (FTA) with Brussels that enables the most frictionless possible trade within the SEM in goods and services. Its negotiation red lines are to end the direct jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the freedom of movement of European Union citizens into the United Kingdom, together with a cessation of mandatory UK contributions to the EU budget.
In drawing up these red lines, Prime Minister Theresa May's administration has effectively closed down the 'Norway model' of third-country trading association with the European Union because it would require the United Kingdom to commit to a continuation of the ECJ's jurisdiction, free movement of people and continued British budget contributions to the EU in exchange for full SEM access. At the same time, Mrs
May has also rejected a Brexit modelled on the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA). Although this would preserve British red lines, it would significantly diminish Britain's current SEM access through new tariff and non-tariff barriers. Instead, Mrs May's government has rejected the notion of a binary choice between the Norway and Canada models by arguing that the United Kingdom will be leaving the European Union from a 'unique starting point' of full regulatory conformity with the SEM, from which bespoke trading relations can forged in key sectors of mutual significance to the UK and EU Member States. Its objective is therefore to secure a 'middle ground' FTA that would maximise UK access to the SEM while preserving its Brexit red lines.
Conversely, Michel Barnier, the European Union's chief Brexit negotiator, has responded by stating that the only option for the United Kingdom is the binary choice that it wishes to avoid:
If the UK wanted to go further than the type of free trade agreement we have signed with Canada, there are other models on the table. Norway and Iceland have chosen to be in the Single market, to accept the rules, and to contribute financially to cohesion policy. But one thing is sure: it is not -and will not -be possible for a third country to have the same benefits as the Norwegian model but the limited obligations of the Canadian model. 5 These EU red lines reflect the political concern in Brussels and European capitals that 'if the UK is seen to get a good deal from negotiations there is a risk of moral hazard, with other member states questioning the link between membership in the Union and receipt of its benefits'. 6 The European Union therefore has an incentive to 'punish' Britain in order to deter 'contagion, but also has an incentive to portray the UK as a spoiler, since this helps reinforce solidarity between the EU27 and distracts from genuine differences between the remaining member states'. 7 This is reflected in Donald Tusk, the European Council President's rejection of any notion of UK '"cherry picking" aspects of its future relationship with the EU or being able to join a "single market a la carte"' on a sector-by-sector approach in any post-Brexit deal. 8 Not surprisingly, the Brexit negotiations have ground rapidly to a halt, and are currently at an impasse because Britain and the remaining EU27 member states have yet to resolve the dilemmas arising from these seemingly irreconcilable red lines. For the United Kingdom, if the EU27 prove unwilling to modify their position on SEM access then the UK will be confronted with a stark choice between accepting the limitations of a CETA model of third-party association, or a 'no deal' scenario where it is forced to trade with the European Union under World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules.
Conversely, the remaining EU27 confront a tension between 'allowing Britain to "have its cake and eat it" … and "cutting off its nose to spite its face" by denying Britain access States 12 -to strengthen its negotiating hand in Brexit talks. Such a security surplus is likely to involve using the promise of ongoing cooperation on defence measures to extract a bespoke deal from the European Union in the defence procurement and industrial sector, and, potentially, beyond. While the European Council has made clear its determination to secure a close partnership with the United Kingdom in areas including security, defence and foreign policy, its position remains that the depth of such a partnership will be limited if the UK is outside the Customs Union and SEM because this will 'inevitably lead to frictions in trade'. 13 Uncertainty therefore remains about the ramifications of Brexit for the United Kingdom and the European Union in these sectors. And yet understanding the implications will be crucial, not least because defence industries are important areas of the United Kingdom's economy as well as vital parts of the country's national security infrastructure. The United Kingdom's defence industry has an turnover of £23 billion per annum, including defence exports worth £5.9 billion, which employs 142,000 predominantly highly skilled personnel. 14 There remain crucial questions, too, about the post-Brexit future of pan-EU initiatives intended to achieve 'ever closer union' through internal market liberalisation, intra-EU armaments cooperation and aspirations to 
The State of Pre-Brexit EU Defence Procurement Cooperation
In essence, the pre-Brexit rules of the game in EU defence procurement and industrial policy reflect a clash between the competing logics of the primacy of national sovereignty versus the counter-imperatives for closer European integration. 15 The logic of sovereignty is enshrined in the pervasive idea that EU Member States should retain the right to autonomy in developing, producing, procuring and trading in military goods for national security reasons. It is this that is enshrined in Article 346 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TfEU), which states that 'any Member State may take such measures as it considers necessary for the protection of the essential interests of its security which are connected with the production or trade in arms, munitions and war material' (italics added). 16 The intention of this is clear: it seeks to ensure that member states retain national control over security of supply in meeting their defence materiel requirements, but defence procurement expenditure and domestic defence industries are also important for national employment and economy.
Member States have used Article 346 provisions to justify greater domestic defence spending to protect the industries from external competition to sustain what is seen as a manufacturing sector of national strategic and economic importance. 17 A consequence has been that while the European Union has succeeded in creating a single market for public procurement of civil goods and services, the application of Article 346 by Member States -motivated either by national security or domestic economic and industrial motives -has limited market liberalisation impact in the EU defence procurement sector. 18 The logic of sovereignty sits in tension with the foundational EU logic of integration through 'ever closer union' and aspirations towards common defence that These factors are significant when it comes to Brexit negotiations. On the one hand, as far as defence procurement and industrial strategy go, the UK government will prioritise gaining tariff-and barrier-free access to the increasingly integrated defence markets in the European Union, because it supports their desire for competitive markets, and because it is essential for UK-based defence firms to retain frictionless access to its European supply chains. Simultaneously, the United Kingdom will also want to retain the kind of sovereignty over defence procurement currently provided by This situation would inevitably constrain Britain's future choices and present new risks when it ceases to be an EU Member State. First, the United Kingdom's new status 'outside the core EU political and economic circle' would result in reduced influence over the future evolution of EU defence procurement directives. Second, the European Commission's insistence that only EU Member States will benefit from European Defence Fund support effectively precludes third-country participation, which suggests that UK participation would be excluded. Even if the United Kingdom were to secure an association agreement of some kind, precedent suggests that it will be unlikely to have the same rights in the process of priority setting for the dispersal of future EU funding because of its 'third country' status. In effect, the United Kingdom would cede considerable influence over the content and direction of European Commission and EDA plans with their associated goals and aspirations to foster a more integrated and potentially more protectionist EU-wide defence industrial policy. Third, a chief UK government concern about defence procurement is that the remaining twenty-seven EU states should not be seen to be discriminating against US suppliers and that the UK freedom to buy equipment from the United States should not be qualified. Reduced British influence arising from its democratic deficit -coupled with the explicit European protectionism evident in the European Defence Fund construct -increases the potential risk of both eventualities materialising.
On the face of it, the post-Brexit deficit in the United Kingdom's influence and choices under an EEA Agreement scenario might be reflected in increased options for the remaining twenty-seven EU states to increase the tempo and extent of 'Europeanisation' of EU defence procurement and defence markets. Paradoxically, however, with this Brexit scenario there would be a shift in the balance of power and influence from those EU Member States seeking more liberalisation of EU defence markets, including Britain and Sweden, towards other member states, notably France and Spain, which believe that the EDTIB should shield states from non-EU competition while helping to promote a 'buy European' policy. 40 That is to say, with reduced UK influence, it is questionable whether other major weapons-producing EU Member States 'would continue to push for competition and efficiency in the defence industry'. 41 The potential barriers to European Commission attempts to intensify intra-EU per cent of the EU defence budget. 56 A key question for EU policymakers would be over the extent to which the EDTIB initiative could progress with Britain's absence. The European Union will also lose its close ties to one of the few countries that meet the 'gold standard' by spending 2 per cent of GDP on defence. As President Trump questions the utility of NATO, this may be poor timing.
Conclusion: the Great Paradox
The British government's stated objectives in the ongoing Brexit negotiations are to leave the EU Single Market and Customs Union, and to negotiate a bespoke free trade agreement with Brussels that enables the most frictionless possible trade within the SEM in goods and services. For their part, the EU27 have an incentive to punish Britain in order to deter contagion and any further fragmentation of the Union. However, the future remains deeply uncertain. Although Prime Minister May has clearly stated a negotiating position, she may well be forced to adopt a new position if the European Union refuses to offer satisfactory terms in an FTA. In this sense, the United Kingdom's options are contingent on the choices and trade-offs of twenty-seven EU Member States.
It may be that the United Kingdom is able to secure a FTA arrangement that provides bespoke third-country access to the SEM. This will be the least disruptive scenario for the United Kingdom's defence procurement and industrial strategy, but it would incur inevitable costs in terms of reduced influence and potential barriers to industrial participation. In the longer-term, however, benefits of such an FTA may be little more than a mirage; if the EU27 continues to pursue further EDTIB integration, ultimately the current scope and utility of Article 346 will be called into question. In this case, the United Kingdom, as an 'associate' member of the European Union, would be bound to follow whatever new directives were passed and would not be able to bargain for similar provisions. Correspondingly, a Brexit based on WTO arrangements provides a veneer of greater British sovereignty over defence procurement but risks the flight of key sections of the domestic industry to the European Union, and calls into question the future viability of the notion of an EDTIB.
Thus, each of the scenarios considered comes with benefits for the UK and for the EU, but each equally is likely to come at a cost. In short, British aspirations to secure an advantageous FTA which carries all the benefits of membership of the SEM without any of the trade-offs over free movement or tariffs seems to be little more than an ideal vision of the future; indeed, the future of UK defence procurement and industrial strategy, is likely to rest on the choices made, not by the UK government, but by its negotiating partners. For the EU27, the credibility of the EDTIB concept will inevitably be more diluted the more that it keeps the United Kingdom at arms-length. The issue for the EU27, therefore, remains one of resolving the tension between letting the UK 'have its cake and eat it' and 'cutting off its nose to spite its face'.
Nevertheless, the overriding conclusion that emerges is that defence procurement in the Brexit negotiations has reverted to the norm. Both scenarios see not just an interplay between the logic of sovereignty and the logic of integration, but a deep, unresolvable tension. It is this tension that necessitates and complicates the trade-offs and choices of the negotiating parties; indeed, it is this tension that also creates the great paradox: the contending logics of national sovereignty and of integration. It also suggests that the integrationist approach, though strongly advocated by the European Union, has gained less traction and less support in practice across the member states. The 'rules of the game' in EU defence procurement are skewed in favour of the logic of sovereignty, bolstered through the provisions of Article 346, and intergovernmental cooperation rather than through supranational EU bodies and initiatives. It is too early to say what this means for the future of EU-wide defence procurement, though it may well indicate that the impact of Brexit on defence procurement will be limited. More broadly, however, it suggests that when push comes to shove, nations will seek to protect the sovereignty of their supply chains over the economic benefits of supranational cooperation.
